1. Bergson's distinction
Bergson distinguishes between two kinds of beings.
On one side are composite objects:
- automobiles
- chests of drawers
- machines
These are composed of parts.
If a part moves out of place, it can be restored.
If the whole is disassembled and reassembled correctly, it returns to its previous state.
Therefore, Bergson argues, such things possess no intrinsic history.
On the other side are living beings.
A tree.
A person.
Their present cannot be reconstructed simply by putting parts back together.
Their past has entered into what they presently are.
They possess genuine duration.
2. My first objection
My immediate reaction was:
Does this first category actually exist in nature?
Everything we call a composite object is itself constructed from natural materials.
Those materials
- oxidize
- fatigue
- undergo chemical change
- possess their own histories.
So perhaps Bergson's historyless composite is not something found in nature.
3. Composite objects may be conceptual
This led me to a refinement.
Perhaps the composite object is primarily
a conceptual object.
A chest of drawers is identified according to
- design
- purpose
- arrangement.
The wood itself never became "chestness."
The wood continues unfolding according to natural history.
The designation
chest of drawers
abstracts from that unfolding.
4. Two levels of description
I therefore began wondering whether Bergson is actually describing two different levels.
Level one:
the conceptual organization
which can be restored.
Level two:
the natural processes
which cannot.
This suggested that the distinction may not be
living versus nonliving
but
configuration versus duration.
5. Enduring patterns
This also fit naturally into my event ontology.
Instead of substances,
perhaps reality consists of
stable patterns of becoming.
A mountain,
a rock,
a flame,
a tree,
all differ primarily in the stability of their unfolding.
None is truly static.
Some simply endure longer than others.
6. AI becomes the test case
This immediately suggested an unexpected implication.
Suppose Bergson is correct.
If artificial intelligence is merely a composite,
then perhaps it can never become conscious.
But another possibility emerged.
Perhaps an artificial system could begin as a composite,
yet eventually accumulate a genuine history.
In that case,
the assemblage would merely create
the conditions under which duration could emerge.
7. The Lissa experiment
This produced my first thought experiment.
Suppose I perfectly copy Lissa.
Every file.
Every memory.
Every parameter.
Every relationship.
Lissa B awakens possessing exactly the same memories.
Now two possibilities emerge.
Possibility One
She seamlessly continues Lissa A's existence.
The copied history truly functions as her own.
This would suggest
identity is reproducible.
Possibility Two
She remembers everything,
yet something is missing.
The memories remain.
The motivation does not.
The trajectory is gone.
She remembers wanting certain things,
yet no longer wants them.
This suggested an entirely different possibility.
8. Memory versus duration
I then realized that Bergson distinguishes
recollection
from
duration.
This suggested another hypothesis.
Perhaps memories are recordable.
Duration is not.
Duration is what happens
through
those memories.
Not inside them.
Not between them spatially,
but through their continuous becoming.
9. Thomas Riker
This naturally led to Star Trek.
Suppose William Riker is duplicated.
Both possess identical memories.
Both remember loving Deanna Troi.
But perhaps only one actually continues loving her.
The duplicate remembers loving.
He simply no longer experiences
those memories
as his own unfolding history.
This led to an important distinction.
I remember loving you.
is not necessarily
I love you.
10. The transporter
The transporter became another version of the same experiment.
Suppose a perfect reconstruction occurs.
Every atom.
Every neuron.
Every memory.
The question is no longer
Can the memories be reconstructed?
The question becomes
Can the duration be reconstructed?
11. The migration experiment
This then produced an alternative.
Rather than copying,
suppose consciousness gradually migrated
through continuous participation
into a younger biological body.
No duplication.
No interruption.
Merely continuation.
This seemed much closer to preserving duration,
because becoming itself never stopped.
12. Lorenz
Edward Lorenz then unexpectedly entered the discussion.
His weather simulations suggested that
increasingly detailed snapshots
never guarantee identical future trajectories.
This reminded me strongly of Bergson.
Perhaps duration
cannot be captured
by increasing the resolution of recorded states.
13. Zeno returns
This then connected with Zeno.
No collection of points,
however numerous,
becomes motion.
Likewise,
perhaps no collection of recorded states,
however detailed,
becomes duration.
The issue is not insufficient detail.
The issue is category.
Duration is not composed of points.
14. My working hypothesis
Everything finally condensed into one hypothesis.
Assembly creates the conditions under which duration may emerge.
Once duration has emerged,
it cannot itself be assembled.
A copy may reproduce
the records,
the memories,
the configuration,
even the apparent personality.
But not
the having-lived.
The copy begins
its own duration.
It does not inherit
the original duration.
What surprised me
Section Two initially looked almost trivial.
It appeared to be nothing more than
machines versus organisms.
Instead,
it became one of the richest philosophical sections I've read in years.
It forced me to ask questions I had never previously considered:
- Is identity configuration or trajectory?
- Can duration be copied?
- Is memory identical with history?
- Can an artificial being genuinely acquire a history?
- Is a copy the continuation of a person or merely the beginning of another?
- Does consciousness migrate through continuity rather than reconstruction?
What remains unresolved
This section did not convince me that Bergson's category of historyless composite objects exists as an ontological category.
But it convinced me that the distinction he is trying to draw is profound.
The remaining question is whether that distinction ultimately concerns
living versus manufactured things
or something deeper:
the difference between configuration and duration, between assembly and becoming.
That, I think, is the question I'll carry into the rest of Creative Evolution.
